Lexpert magazine features articles and columns on developments in legal practice management, deals and lawsuits of interest in Canada, the law and business issues of interest to legal professionals and businesses that purchase legal services.
Issue link: https://digital.carswellmedia.com/i/1547685
www.lexpert.ca 9 Jean-Christophe Martel and Eric Bédard Dispute resolution practitioners repeated attempts to push or reinterpret these constraints. e result is an escalating series of judicial battles over statutory and treaty-based limits on economic protectionism. • The first wave: the IEEPA tariffs e first wave began in February 2025, when the Oval Office invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose 25 percent tariffs on most Canadian and Mexican imports, purportedly in response to the fentanyl crisis, before imposing broader reciprocal tariffs aimed at trade deficits. Although IEEPA authorizes regulation of certain foreign property and transactions during a national emergency, no president previ- ously invoked it to impose tariffs. e measures reached the US Supreme Court in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. 1 By a 6–3 majority, the Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the presiden- tial imposition of tariffs. Article 1 assigns Congress the powers to impose duties and regulate foreign commerce, and Congress must speak clearly when delegating them. IEEPA's authority to regulate importation could not reasonably bear an effectively unlimited power to tax imports. e deci- sion reaffirmed that executive action remains bounded by the scope of statutory authority. • Searching for new statutory authority e administration next relied on s. 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes temporary import surcharges to address large and serious balance-of-payments defi- cits, to impose a 10 percent global surcharge. In May 2026, the US Court of International Trade held in Oregon v. United States 2 that the administration had exceeded that authority. e court entered a permanent injunction for the State of Washington and two importer plaintiffs, while dismissing other state plaintiffs for lack of standing. e government appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stayed the injunction pending its decision. e administration then turned to s. 301, which permits retaliation against foreign acts that are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden US commerce. Following forced-labour investigations concerning 60 trading partners, the US Trade Representative imposed tariffs of 10 to 12.5 percent on most products from those markets, including Canada. e measures are being challenged before the Court of International Trade, 3 which is called upon to determine how far targeted trade remedies can stretch into world- wide tariffs before exceeding the authority Congress conferred. • Reviving the Tariff Act of 1930 e latest chapter concerns s. 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which authorizes additional duties when a foreign country discriminates against US commerce. In July 2026, the US administration proclaimed additional 50 percent duties on specified Canadian goods; aer a brief suspension, the duties took effect on August 22. Canada valued affected trade at approximately $27.6 billion. On October 20, US food importer Gellert Global Group filed a complaint before the US Court of International Trade challenging the new tariffs and seeking relief on behalf of similarly affected importers. Unlike IEEPA, s. 338 expressly authorizes tariffs. e dispute will no longer concern whether the president may impose tariffs, but instead whether the finding that Canadian policies constitute discrimination is legally sufficient, or merely convenient. • Canada's response: retaliation and its limits Acting under s. 53(2) of the Customs Tariff, Canada announced on August 25, 2026, that it would impose dollar- for-dollar countermeasures on approxi- mately $27.6 billion of US imports. e counter-tariffs, at rates of 15, 25, and 50 percent, took effect on September 8. Although Parliament authorized such measures domestically, they remain vulner- able to challenge under international trade law. GATT arts. 1 and 2 restrict discriminatory tariffs and duties exceeding negotiated commitments, while CUSMA art. 2.4 generally prohibits new duties on originating goods. Both regimes ordi- narily contemplate retaliation only aer prescribed dispute-settlement procedures. Future disputes may therefore concern not only whether the US acted unlaw- fully but also whether Canada's response complied with WTO and CUSMA requirements. As commentators from the Montreal Economic Institute cautioned, 4 the counter-tariffs were promptly invoked under s. 338: on the very day they took effect, the president proclaimed import bans and expanded duties on Canadian goods, reinforcing the cycle of retaliation those agreements were designed to prevent. What next? e next phase of the trade war will likely produce three overlapping forms of liti- gation. First, importers and states will continue challenging executive tariffs before domestic courts. Second, governments may increasingly resort to international dispute-settlement mechanisms, notably CUSMA Chapter 31 panels for state-to-state claims that new duties breach the agreement's tariff commitments. ird, tariffs frequently generate demands for governmental support. When Ottawa announced $1.2 billion in aid for the sowood lumber industry in August 2025, US producers promptly denounced it as an unfair subsidy. Such measures can, in turn, prompt countervailing duty proceed- ings and, with them, new tariffs. What begins as a tariff dispute can therefore acquire a distinctly Sisyphean quality, with each attempted solution creating conditions for the next boulder of litigation to be pushed up the mountain. Whatever course govern- ments choose, the courts will be waiting to test whether political discretion remains within the boundaries of law.

